“A quick connection between trains was by accident, not intent.”

An 1864 stock certificate for shares in the Richmond & York River Railroad Co., one of the five roads that converged at Richmond. From Dave Bright’s incomparable Confederate Railroads website.
The first chapters of Carl Park’s Ironclad Down: USS Merrimack-CSS Virginia from Design to Destruction set the historical context for the design, construction and deployment of that most famous Confederate ironclad, C.S.S. Virginia. Park summarizes the evolving technology of shell-firing naval artillery, screw propulsion, U.S. naval policy, and the early careers of men like Stephen Mallory, John Luke Porter, and John Mercer Brooke, before getting into the real heart of the book, which is the fine, granular detail of the ironclad’s construction. I may talk more about that later, but for now I want to highlight something that caught me a little by surprise.
In Chapter 10, “The Long Road to Portsmouth,” Park discusses the logistical challenges present in moving the iron plate armor for C.S.S. Virginia from the Tredegar Ironworks in Richmond, where it was rolled, to the (formerly U.S., now Confederate) navy yard at Gosport, where Virginia was being fitted out. In the process, he mentions an aspect of Richmond’s position as a railroad hub that had substantial implications for the large-scale movement of men and materiel through the city and the region that would see almost non-stop campaigning and fighting between two major armies for four long years:
To illustrate this problem, Park includes a well-known map of Richmond, dated 1864 and published as part of the atlas accompanying the Official Records, but actually drawing on antebellum, civilian maps as its source material. I’d looked at this map many, many times, and even made note of the different rail lines and depots, but never thought about its significance in terms of military logistics. Here’s the map from the OR, showing the location of the terminals for four of the five railroads reaching Richmond:
A fifth rail line, the Richmond & York River Railroad, came to an end southeast of town, between the base Chimborazo Hill and Rocketts. All the space in between the depots had to covered on foot, by carriage, or (in the case of cargo) by drays, all of which added time, inconvenience and expense — especially when you remember that everything in Richmond is uphill from everything else.
To be sure, situations like this were hardly limited to Richmond or the South. Railroads construction across the United States was a free-for-all in the decades before the war, with little standardization, and few incentives for railroad builders to find ways to interlock their roads. The primary only rail hub in Texas, Houston, was the terminus of five roads, all with their own depots and freight yards, running on at least two different gauges. It was a bigger problem for the Confederacy, of course, because the South lacked the industrial resources to expand its railroads quickly. Tredegar had enough trouble supplying armor and guns for ships like Virginia, let alone rolling out miles and miles of new, iron rail.
It’s also to the credit of Richmonders that they recognized this rail transfer problem early on, and took some measures to correct it. Just days after the fall of Fort Sumter in Charleston, the Richmond City Council voted to authorize the state to construct rail connections through the city streets to link different roads, “to be used only for the purposes of the State, or of the Confederate States, during the war, and to he removed when no longer required for these purposes.” Good progress was reported almost immediately, but at some point work stalled, to be picked up again in fits and starts through the remainder of the war. Most of the terminals remained isolated, leading to bizarre spectacles like this one from March 1862, with a steam locomotive being hauled through the streets by both mules and curious bystanders:
Allen’s locomotive ended up being dragged through the heart of Richmond’s commercial district, close by the Capitol; I wonder if the sight caused any Commonwealth or Confederate legislators to push harder for completion of the rail connections.
It seems that, for all their recognition of the problem and intentions on fixing it early on, Richmond’s success in linking its rail depots was limited. A map of Richmond (available here) dated 1867 but almost probably surveyed in mid- to late 1865, shows that only two railroads — the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac, coming into town from the northwest, and the Richmond & Petersburg, coming up from the south — were eventually connected via 8th Street. A second line from the R.F. & P. depot ran east a short distance along Broad Street toward the Central Railroad depot on the east side of town, but never made it past the Capitol.

Richmond city plan, drawn by U.S. military engineers shortly after the war, showing (red) additional lines of track laid to connect the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad depot (upper left), and the Richmond & Petersburg depot, lower left. Map from Civil War Richmond. The total length of new street rail laid appears to be only about two-thirds of a mile.
You can’t read much about the conflict of 1861-65 without getting a heavy dose of life in wartime Richmond, and one quickly comes to understand how it’s been rightfully called “one of the most heavily networked cities in the Confederacy.” [3] Nonetheless, its easy to forget how the little things in peacetime — like, say, an accommodation to the protectionist lobbying of draymen and carriage hacks, looking to maintain a demand for their trade — can complicate life tremendously during the stress of war.
And what I wouldn’t give tohave seen that big steam locomotive dragged through the streets of the Confederate capital by men and mules, for want of a mile or so of decent track.
__________
[1] Carl D. Park, Ironclad Down: USS Merrimack – CSS Virginia, from Construction to Destruction (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 2007), 127-30.
[2] Richmond Dispatch, March 8, 1862, 2.
[3] William G. Thomas, The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War, and the Making of Modern America (New Haven: Yale, 2011), 93.
Plus les choses changent, plus elles restent les mêmes.
I, too, would give just about anything to see a big old steam locomotive being moved through a city, uphill, by men and mules.
Obviously, the Confederacy didn’t have very adept lobbyists, otherwise one representing an interest that would have benefited from the rail lines being connected no doubt would have taken that opportunity to have arranged a stroll for a handful of powerful officials that just happened to pass southeast of the capitol, thereby enabling the officials to witness the spectacle.
This was quite common in mid-century. “Union Stations” were developed later as a response. Remember the attack on the 6th Massachusetts in Baltimore was caused by the lack of connecting lines across the city.
Excellent observation, thanks.
“Obviously, the Confederacy didn’t have very adept lobbyists, otherwise one representing an interest that would have benefited from the rail lines being connected no doubt would have taken that opportunity to have arranged a stroll for a handful of powerful officials that just happened to pass southeast of the capitol, thereby enabling the officials to witness the spectacle.”
Railroads were not particulalry gung-ho about linking up with each other, among the others things they feared they would lose control of the rolling stock.
This state of southern railroads contributed significantly as well to the failure of the Produce Loan Agency — one of the several increasingly desperate attempts to finance the CSA and the war — supervised by J D. B. De Bow (who managed very well financially throughout the war and after, even increasing his personal wealth, partly by not participating in the CSA financing programs himself). He was to purchase on behalf of the government from plantation owners in the west the staples, which would float loans from Europe. It didn’t work for many reasons — including the successful Union blockade, but it particularly couldn’t work because there was little or no rail connection between these different parts.
Most of all it is notable that De Bow, who was so much an architect of secession and the war, soon was privately convinced there was no opportunity the confederacy could win the war. It was even more under-capitalized than the War of 1812, conducted by Madison’s administration against Britain. De Bow saw this, but wouldn’t say so publicly. He was the spirit of Boosterism!
If any of the architects of secession and war would figure out a way to come out ahead, if would be De Bow.
Great piece, Andy. Thanks for posting. IMO, one of the best things the Union did, which helped win the war, was to federalize the railroads and put Herman Haupt in charge of them.
Of course, that gives me an excuse to repost this gem:
Andy, great piece. As I wade through the CS Citizens Files, I often find transactions where Richmond businesses (mostly Tredegar) were contracted to handle the transfers between railroads in Richmond. Particularly the heavy guns.
One additional transportation link I wold add is the James River Canal. Bellona foundry upstream of Richmond often floated their heavy guns down on the canal, where Tredegar offloaded them. The guns were then moved to the appropriate railroad depot and forwarded to the appropriate military post. All of that handling was “billable” and Tredegar did bill!
I’d love to know the name of the Allen locomotive and where it served after its famous trip.